

The Schizo-Political: Repression, Liberation and the Beyond

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I don't believe in father
in mother,
got no papa mummy ...
... I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself ...

Antonin Artaud in "Here Lies"

Physicists say that holes are not the absence of particles but particles traveling
faster than the speed of light ...

Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (2005: 32)

This paper is on the question of the 'political'. It asks: can the Deleuzian perspective to the political be reduced to simply a pragmatic approach to problems and affairs, to 'what works', or to the uniquely American idea that truth is to be tested by the practical consequences of belief? Is Deleuze political; but political in a way that is rather different; to the indifferent to the different he hence appears apolitical; all the more because Deleuze is perhaps a proper name for a redefinition of the political in the West (Gandhi, Tagore and Ambedkar are analogous figures in the East). What appears to be a (black) *hole* – a 'blind spot' in Deleuze's philosophy – the perspective to/on the political – is perhaps thoughts-practices on the very political travelling faster than or travelling in a manner radically different from the way thoughts-practices on/of the political have conventionally travelled in modern Europe. We shall see in later sections of the paper how the distinction between the 'neurotic phenomenon' and the 'psychotic phenomenon', between Oedipalizing impulses and 'anti-oedipal'/'an-oedipal' impulses, between a paradigm marked by 'The Repressive Hypothesis' and a paradigm unmarred

by the ‘metaphysics of repressive-liberation’ could offer contesting perspectives to the political. Foucault foregrounds the re-conceptualization of the political in Deleuze in the Preface to *Anti-Oedipus*:

Anti-Oedipus can best be read as an “art,” in the sense that is conveyed by the term “erotic art,” ... [it is] less concerned with *why* this or that than with *how* to proceed. *How does one introduce desire¹ into thought, into discourse, into action? How can and must desire deploy its forces within the political domain and grow more intense in the process of overturning the established order? Ars erotica, ars theoretica, ars politico.*

Three, at least three theoretical departures mark Foucault’s intervention. One, he urges us to read *Anti-Oedipus*, not as a text having its own logic of readability, but as a work of (erotic) ‘art’; or is he suggesting that the *reading* of *Anti-Oedipus* – the book – is an/the *experience* of erotic art; how one would do that, i.e. read – and I stress read – *Anti-Oedipus* as erotic art would of course be a question; further, what does Foucault mean by ‘erotic art’? Two, Foucault reads *Anti-Oedipus* as less concerned with questions of ‘causality’ (i.e. a response to the quintessential ‘why’ question), and more as a guide to the ‘how’, the “how to proceed”; is it then a kind of guide to ethical action and living; an itinerary of everyday ethical praxis. Three, Foucault brings *ars erotica*, *ars theoretica*, and *ars politico* in an appositional relationship, with *ars theoretica* as the middle term. One wonders, how does *ars erotica* and *ars politico* get connected? What is the *ars theoretica* of such a connection; a connection that has hitherto remained unexplored; all the more because ‘desire’ had been handed over to Freud (and the psychoanalytic praxis

¹ Foucault, as if, sees Deleuze taking his work on ‘subject and power’ to ‘subject, power and *desire*’ – “deterritorialized” flows of desire, to be precise; flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities (See in Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: xvll), desire as *productive*. Deleuze and Guattari insist that “the unconscious, too, operates according to a set of constitutive syntheses in order to process or constitute experience in such a way as to guarantee the free play of desire; and they insist that psychoanalysis must either be shown to conform to these processes or else be condemned as metaphysical. Moreover, in as much as psychoanalysis is a strictly capitalist institution, its system of representation is understood as merely an expression and reinforcement of the capitalist social order. Hence, the Oedipus complex expresses, first, the privatization of reproduction in the nuclear family in a decoded social order and, secondly, the delegation to the family of certain recoding functions. ... Deleuze and Guattari will therefore call not just for psychoanalysis, but even more so for the capitalist social relations” (see Holland in Stivale, 2005: 59).

steeped in Oedipalizing Empires and “The Repressive Hypothesis”) and the ‘political’ had been handed over to Marx (and the socialist praxis steeped in historical materialism, Statism and the ‘historical inevitability thesis’ as justification for primitive accumulation in the colonies). *Anti-Oedipus* is a ‘practical’, not just a theoretical response to the respective orphan hood of the denuded registers of desire and politics; it is a practical stapling of desire and politics; stapled in *praxis*, not *just* in theory; stapled in the praxis of ethics and the ethics of praxis.

Foucault sees *Anti-Oedipus* as a book *of* (and *not* ‘on’) ethics; a book of ethical action and living; a book that is not *on* ethics (which is usual in philosophy) but a book *of* ethics, a book that itself, in itself, exudes ethics. But how can a book be ethical? *Being* anti-oedipal, *becoming* anti-oedipal is for Foucault – who is standing at the threshold of foregrounding concepts like Greek *askesis* (as against Christian asceticism) – a *way of thinking (the ethical) as also (a form ethical) living*. The question of *Anti-Oedipus* or the ‘anti-oedipal question’ is:

... how does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? ... The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the *body*.

Foucault thus marks a sharp distinction (or perhaps not so sharp a distinction) between *Anti-Oedipus*– the book², and ‘anti-oedipus’ – the subject/shizo-position; between *Anti-Oedipus* – the written text, and ‘anti-oedipus’ – the being (*being* anti-oedipus), the

² What is a book: “you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you're even more perverse and depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next book like a box contained in the first or containing it. And you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the book, and so on and on. Or there's another way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is “Does it work, and how does it work?” How does it work for you? ... This second way of reading's intensive: something comes through or it doesn't. There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It's like plugging in to an electric circuit ... “contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is a parallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005: 11; also see Poxon and Stivale in Stivale, 2005: 73).

process of becoming, the praxis, the art – not art as an *object*, but art *as* artisanal, art as the art *of*, art of doing-living-being. In other words, Foucault renders anti-oedipus, or the anti-oedipal (as against the Oedipal) question *asketic*. What however is *askesis*? Foucault calls *askesis* “the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on [her]self in order to have access to the *truth*’ (Foucault, 2005: 13). For Foucault, *askesis*, as it appears in the West ... postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right. ... truth is not given to the subject by the simple act of knowledge (*connaissance*), ... *for the subject to have right of access to the truth he [or she] must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point other than himself [or herself*. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject’s *being* into play. ... *there can be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject*’, without a long labor of *askesis* (Foucault, 2005: 15-16).

Thus while the oedipal is a hopelessly melancholic victim-subject of the foundational *asceticism* of being-in-the-family, while the oedipal is a product of the “multiplicity of desire” being subjugated to the “twofold law of structure and lack” (i.e. the Totem and the Taboo) in psychoanalysis, the anti-oedipal is an *art* of living, i.e. *living* desire. Thus while the oedipal is about a tragic ‘*subject* of asceticism’, the anti-oedipal is about the asketic *praxis* of “necessary transformations on self”, a praxis that keeps eros alive (here Foucault sharply distinguishes between Christian asceticism and Greek *askesis*). There is thus a deep connection between *Anti-Oedipus* by Deleuze and Guattari – published in 1972 and *Hermeneutics of the Subject* by Foucault – lectures delivered in 1982.

Anti-Oedipus or the anti-oedipal is thus for Foucault a “tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives” (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: xiii). It is also about “political practice as an *intensifier* of thought, and analysis as a *multiplier* of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action” (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: xiii). It is an attack on “what is all-too-

human in mankind, on oedipalized [territorialities like Family, Church, School, Nation, Party] and oedipalizing analyses and *neurotic modes of living*”, as also on “Christ, Christianity, and the herd³” or the “masses” (as against the “pack” [of wolves] in *The Thousand Plateaus*; the connection between Marx and Nietzsche, and not Freud, need to be noted). It is an attack on the “neurotic’s dream of a tranquilized and conflict-free existence” however much impossible.

It is also a turn *to* psychosis; as also to the psychotic of desire, as against the neuroticization of desire in psychoanalysis. But how does one theorize psychosis? Or perhaps how does one theorize from the standpoint of psychosis and not from the standpoint of neurosis (I have in mind *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and its Discontents* as classic instances of theorizing the human condition and culture from the standpoint of neurosis). Further, how does one conceptualize desire? How does one introduce desire into thought, and action? If one wants to theorize the flows of money or flows of capital-land-labor, one can turn to Marx. But if one wishes to theorize the flows of desire, i.e., the *libidinal economy*, one cannot turn to Freud; since Freud reduces desire to the familial complex, Oedipalisation and castration (Deleuze hence turns to Nietzsche, the Nietzschean theory of affects and intensities). The need to theorize psychosis (as also desire) takes us to the next section: the *structural* distinction between neurosis and psychosis. The structural distinction between neurosis and psychosis could in turn offer us contesting perspectives to the political.

³ Such a herd instinct, is based on “the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life. The very desire that was brought so glaringly into focus in Europe with Hitler, Mussolini, and fascism; the desire that is still at work, making us all sick, today. *Anti-Oedipus* starts by reviving Reich's question with respect to the rise of fascism: “How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?” (Seem in Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: ml).

I. Question of Psychosis: The Windscreen View

This section shall look at how the ‘question of psychosis’ (not psychosis) has figured in the works of Deleuze (and Guattari), as also Lacan and Derrida; and see how the process of ‘making sense’ of the question of psychosis and the respective relationship forged with the question of psychosis has given birth to a particular configuration, an architecture of psychoanalysis; at times, leading to a radical renaming: ‘schizo-analysis’ or ‘crypto-analysis’ (as in Derrida). I have called this the ‘windscreen view’. The next section shall look at how the question of psychoanalysis has figured in the works of the *first* ‘savage’ psychoanalyst, Girindrasekhar Bose, who was in conversation with Freud and who wrote (psychoanalytically singed) commentaries on the Bhagvad Gita, the Yoga Sutras, the Puranas and proposed in lieu of Freudian psychoanalysis, *A New Theory of Mental Life*. I have designated this: insights drawn from the ‘rearview mirror’. The paper is thus a negotiation between the windscreen view (i.e. the direct vision of the ‘way ahead’ [or ‘what is to come’]) and the rearview mirror (i.e. the reflected vision of ‘what has been left behind’). *Driving* in terms of the *fort-da* between the windscreen view and the rearview mirror is an apt metaphor of the methodology that marks the writing of this paper. In other words, one needs to negotiate between insights coming from a ‘vanishing present’ and a ‘vanishing past’ as one writes. One thus needs to write at the *cusp* of questions coming from the (French) contemporary and questions coming from the past, in this case, the ‘Indian past and the Indian context’ (i.e. questions pertaining to critical rewriting of psychoanalysis in India).

I (a). Foucault: Critique of ‘The Repressive Hypothesis’:

Would it be right to read *Anti-Oedipus* as a response to or a critique of what Foucault in *History of Sexuality* (Volume One) calls ‘The Repressive Hypothesis’ (just like *Hermeneutics of the Subject* by Foucault could be a response to *Anti-Oedipus*); in other words, it is a critique of a rather charged French milieu marked by what Foucault calls “anti-repressive politics” and a “surge of [liberated] libido” (Foucault in Deleuze and

Guattari, (2000: xl)? Foucault begins *History of Sexuality* (Volume One) with sharp sarcasm pertaining to how a certain *story* regarding an earlier, i.e. a seventeenth century *frankness* and a later, i.e. a nineteenth century Victorian *repression* of sexuality, has become paradigmatic of not just our understanding of ‘sexuality’, but our understanding of the ‘political’ as well:

... *the story goes* ... At the beginning of the seventeenth century a certain *frankness* was still common ... Sexual practices had *little need of secrecy*; ... But twilight soon fell upon this bright day, followed by the monotonous nights of the Victorian bourgeoisie. ... On the subject of sex, *silence* became the rule. ... This *discourse on modern sexual repression* holds up well, owing no doubt to *how easy it is to uphold*. ... *Whatsustains our eagernessto speak of sex in terms of repression* is doubtless this opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, to utter truths and promise bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation, and manifold pleasures; ... This is perhaps what also explains the market value attributed not only to what is said about sexual repression, but also to the mere fact of lending an ear to those who would eliminate the effects of repression. ... *Why do we say*, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that *we are repressed? By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated?* What led us to show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we silence? (Foucault, 1978: 3-10)

Foucault raises two serious doubts concerning what he terms the “repressive hypothesis”. First doubt: Is sexual repression truly an established historical fact? Is the triple edict: (i) seventeenth century frankness, (ii) nineteenth century repression and (iii) twenty-first century liberation, the only way to write a ‘history of sexuality’? Or are *other* histories of ‘sexuality’ possible; not in an empirical, spatial sense; but in a conceptual, historiographical sense? Second doubt: do the workings of power really belong primarily to the category of repression? Or are *other* histories of power possible; histories other than that of repression; such that one can also think (or will have to think) the (ethico-)political in terms other than the dyad ‘repression/oppression’-‘liberation/emancipation’? Is *Anti-Oedipus* and the anti-oedipal the text of that Other

thinking or practice of the political? Does *Anti-Oedipus* and the anti-oedipal offer us ground for a politics different from the received notion of politics, politics revolving around the triad of repression-confession-liberation. The crucial question for Deleuze hence is not just what constitutes our sickness today, but more profoundly what constitutes *healing* as well. Which is why, what *Anti-Oedipus* “attempts to cure us of is [not just sickness but] the cure itself”.

I (b). Turn to Psychosis: Premised on the critique of *The Repressive Hypothesis* it would not be wrong to read *Anti-Oedipus* as a response to what Lacan calls the ‘neurotic experience’; and a turn to ‘psychotic experience’, and the psychotic of experience. Or perhaps, read post-structuralist philosophy as a re-reading of experience through the language and logic (*not* illogic) of psychosis. Psychosis and the beyond of the normativized/neuroticized human condition (including the ‘non-human’ or *the animal that therefore I am*) – as also the *machinic* (in Deleuze and Guattari, especially) – have played a major part in the rethinking of philosophy since the 1950s; one could call it *The Other Side of Philosophy*. What would be philosophy’s relation to psychosis or what could, building on Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, be called ‘Beyond the Neurotic Principle’? What problematic does psychosis inaugurate in philosophy? Lacan’s *Seminar III* (1953), Foucault’s *History of Madness*⁴ (1956) and Abraham-Torok-Derrida’s *Cryptonymy* (1986) are all efforts at making sense of psychosis: the *illogic of sense* or the *logic of non-sense*. “1914: One or many wolves” is another (2005: 26-38).

Your work as a clinician is to understand *the particular way, the peculiar way* [the psychotic] *makes sense of things* [and the world]. (Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Ordinary Psychosis Revisited’, *Psychoanalytical Notebooks*, Issue 19, July 2009).

⁴ The Foucauldian Turn in *History of Madness* (1956) to those “obscure gestures, necessarily forgotten as soon as they are accomplished, through which a culture rejects something which for it will be the Exterior; and throughout its history, this hollowed-out void, this white space by means of which it isolates itself. ... the division which gives a culture the face of its positivity: this is the originary thickness in which a culture – Western culture – takes shape. To interrogate a culture about its limit-experiences is to question it at the confines of history about a tear that is something like the very birth of its history” (Foucault, 2006: xxix). Deleuze returns to this *limit experience* of culture – ‘madness’ – in both philosophy and politics.

Deleuze and Guattari takes it upon themselves to understand “the particular, the peculiar way” the psychotic makes sense of words, make sense of things, make sense of words as things, and things as words; in other words, they make sense of thinking through psychotic thinking (where psychotic thinking is *not* non-thinking, but thinking nevertheless; *not* lack of insight; but an Other insight). In the chapter “1914: One or Many Wolves” in *The Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze takes up the question of the structural distinction between neurosis and psychosis (like Freud took up the question of the structural distinction between mourning and melancholia [1917]):

.. his [i.e. Freud’s] article of 1915 on “The Unconscious,” ... deals with the difference between neurosis and psychosis. Freud says that hysterics or obsessives are people capable of making a global comparison between a sock and a vagina, a scar and castration, etc. Doubtless, it is at one and the same time that they apprehend the object globally and perceive it as lost. Yet it would never occur to a neurotic to grasp the skin erotically as a multiplicity of pores, little spots, little scars or black holes, or to grasp the sock erotically as a multiplicity of stitches. The psychotic can: “we should expect the multiplicity of these little cavities to prevent him from using them as substitutes for the female genital.” Comparing a sock to a vagina is OK, it’s done all the time, but you’d have to be insane to compare a pure aggregate of stitches to a field of vaginas: that’s what Freud says. This represents an important clinical discovery: a whole difference in style between neurosis and psychosis. ... No sooner does Freud discover the greatest art of the unconscious, this art of molecular multiplicities, than we find him tirelessly at work bringing back molar unities, reverting to his familiar themes of *the father*, *the penis*, *the vagina*, Castration with a capital C ... (On the verge of discovering a rhizome, Freud always returns to mere roots.) ... The reductive procedure of the 1915 article is quite interesting: he says that the comparisons and identifications of the neurotic are guided by *representations of things*, whereas all the psychotic has left are *representations of words* (for example, the word “hole”). “*What has dictated the substitution is not the resemblance between the things denoted but the sameness of the words used to express them*”. (2005: 27)

Deleuze (as also Lacan in *Seminar III*, 1953) is taking us beyond the ‘manifest clinical symptomatology’ of neurosis and psychosis to a structural difference between the two, one that is not based on a psychosexual aetiology. Lacan opens *Seminar III* (1953) by saying that he wants to address not the treatment, but the *question* of the treatment of the psychoses, a fact that is reflected in the title given to the paper that emerges from this Seminar and is printed in the *Ecrits* – “On A Question *Prior* To Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis”. That is, Lacan is not simply aiming to propose a better technique for working within the established theoretical framework, but rather attempting to re-examine the theory of psychosis and propose something Freud never fully achieved – a structural distinction between the neuroses and the psychoses. It is with respect to the Wolf Man Case that Lacan inaugurates thinking around ‘foreclosure’ or primitive *verwerfung* (as distinguished from psychoanalysis’ insistence on repression); thinking around foreclosure (and not repression) could in turn help one rethink the political, rethink theories of hegemony and theories of the *outside* (see Chakrabarti, Dhar and Cullenberg, 2012; chapters 3 and 4):

The progress of the analysis of the [Wolf Man], the contradictions which are revealed by the traces through which we follow the specification of his position in the human world, point to a *Verwerfung*, a rejection (and not *verneinung*: ‘repression’) – literally, *it has always been for him as if the genital plane did not exist. ...There is no trace of this plane in the symbolic register ...* Castration, which is precisely what didn’t exist for him, manifests itself in the form of something he imagines – to have cut his little finger, so deeply that it hangs solely by a little piece of skin... There is a sort of immediate external world, of manifestations perceived in what I will call a primitive *real*, a non-symbolized *real*⁵, despite the symbolic form, in the usual sense of the term, that this phenomenon takes... it really is a *psychotic phenomenon* that we are dealing with (Lacan, 1997: 58-59).

⁵ For Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, “the Real, which includes the social, the individual (“the actual”) and the virtual, is composed entirely of lines or “segments”. Ontology is *cartography*, the study of those lines, but also a politics, “the study of the dangers of each line” ... This “study” is itself, or at least is intended to provoke, *intervention* in the present, coincident with grasping the nature of those lines and their dangers, and how those are functioning in any given domain” (Houle in Stivale, 2005: 90).

While Lacan inaugurates thinking around foreclosure (i.e. *Verwerfung*), as against ‘The Repressive Hypothesis’, in psychoanalysis, Derrida and Deleuze both focus on the wolves. Deleuze focuses on the *pack* of wolves; the multiplicity of wolves; the multiplicity of multiplicity. Derrida, like Freud, as also unlike Freud, still focuses on the *number* of wolves. For Derrida what is important is that there are *six* wolves; and six in Russian is *siestorka*; *siestorkais* sister or stands for sister. This *key word*, *siestorka*, for Derrida, “no doubt unutterable” and “unknown for the moment, would have to be polysemic, expressing multiple meanings through a single phonetic structure. One of these would remain shrouded, but the other, or several other meanings now equivalent, would be stated through distinct phonetic structures, that is through synonyms”. Derrida would call them *cryptonyms*⁶ (“words that hide”) because of their allusion to a foreign or archaic meaning, apparently not having any phonetic or semantic relationship to the *prohibited* [or the *taboo*] *word* (Abraham and Torok, 1986: 18–19). One hence needs what Derrida calls “the science of cryptological interpretation” (1986: xv) or *cryptoanalysis* (see Chakrabarti, Dhar and Dasgupta, 2015 for a rethinking of the political in terms of the crypt, cryptonymy and cryptoanalysis).

Deleuze, on the other hand, asks: what it is to *be* ‘wolf’; to “become-wolf” (2005: 28)? The number of wolves is not so important for Deleuze; “Who is ignorant of the fact that wolves travel in packs”? “Only Freud” is perhaps ignorant; and now Derrida. Deleuze shows how the wolves will be purged of their multiplicity by Freud; it was, as if, already decided from the very beginning that animals could serve only to represent coitus between parents, or, conversely, be represented by coitus between parents. “There will always be a reduction to the *One*: the little scars, the little holes, will become subdivisions of the great scar or supreme hole named *castration*; the wolves will become substitutes for a *single Father* who turns up everywhere or wherever they put him”. Deleuze calls this the neuroticisation of experience by Freud. “What should have been

⁶ *Crypt* for Derrida is “a certain organization of places [*lieux*] designed to *lead astray*” (Derrida in Abraham and Torok, 1986: xxxvi). *Crypt* is also “a topographical arrangement made to keep (conserve-hidden) the *living dead* (xxxvi). The cryptic place is also a “sepulcher”. *Crypt* is “a cipher, a code”; this is a movement as if from *crypt* as noun to *crypt* as verb. “To *crypt* is to cipher, a symbolic or semiotic operation that consist of manipulating a secret code”.

done is the opposite, all of this should be understood in *intensity*: the Wolf is the pack, in other words, the multiplicity instantaneously apprehended as such insofar as it approaches or moves away from zero, each distance being non-decomposable". The wolves for Deleuze "designate an intensity, a band of intensity, a threshold of intensity on the Wolf-Man's body without organs". "The wolf, as the instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity in a given region, is *not a representative, a substitute, but an I feel. I feel myself becoming* a wolf, one wolf among others, on the edge of the pack. A cry of anguish, the only one Freud hears: Help me not become wolf (or the opposite, Help me not fail in this becoming). It is not a question of representation: don't think for a minute that it has to do with representing oneself as a wolf. The wolf, wolves, are intensities, speeds, temperatures, non-decomposable variable distances". Deleuze thus speaks of *wolf-ing*; leading in turn to the distinction between the *schizo-position*: "being on the periphery, holding on by a hand or a foot"; as opposed to the *paranoid⁷ position* of the mass subject, with all the identifications of the individual with the group, the group with the leader, and the leader with the Oedipalized group.⁸

"If Marx thought of power negatively – as ideology, which can conceal or distort the real relations of life – Foucault thought of power positively, as the very force of life" Deleuze took this tradition one step further by conceptualizing 'desire' " as not based on lack but "desire as productive". The unconscious, too, is productive; the unconscious is

⁷ "For Deleuze and Guattari most of western thought has been built on a paranoid structure [or a] 'paranoid social machine' ... we hear the voice of law, society, conscience or the father (or even, in capitalism, the laws of the market). Paranoia is interpretive: we always ask what things mean, attempting to find the law, ground or authority behind signs. Traditional psychoanalysis merely intensifies this tendency by interpreting all our dreams and desires as messages from our guilty conscience". Deleuze and Guattari (Seem in Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: xvll) move "from paranoia to schizophrenia, from fascism to revolution, from breakdowns to breakthroughs". What is investigated is the "process of life flows as they oscillate from one extreme to the other, on a scale of intensity that goes from 0 ("I never asked to be born . . . leave me in peace"), *the body without organs*, to the nth power ("I am all that exists, all the names in history"), *the schizophrenic process of desire*.

⁸ "Marx transformed bourgeois political economy into a revolutionary materialism by refusing the subordination of labour to determination by capital; in the same way, Deleuze and Guattari transform bourgeois psychoanalysis into a revolutionary materialism by refusing the subordination of libido to determination by the nuclear family and the Oedipus complex. Just as the aim of universal history in Marx is to free labour-power from the last and most abstract of its external determinations, its alienation by capital, the aim of universal history for Deleuze and Guattari is to free libido from the last and most abstract of its external determinations, its alienation by the Oedipus complex" (Holland in Stivale 2005: 57).

not a *theatre* (of representations), it is a *factory* (of productions). Politics “must conform to the “logic” of the syntheses of the unconscious, or else be condemned as repressive”. However, for Deleuze and Guattari “desire is opposed as much to gratification as it is to repression” (see Colebrook, 2002: xv). Perhaps, one needs to understand desire and the unconscious (as also the political) beyond the familiar hypothesis repression/liberation, lack/efflorescence, non-fulfillment/gratification etc.

II. The an-Oedipal: In the Rearview Mirror

Who believes in all this—Oedipus, castration, etc.? The Greeks? Then the Greeks did not produce in the same way they believed? The Hellenists? Do the Hellenists believe that the Greeks produced according to their beliefs? This is true at least of the nineteenth-century Hellenists, about whom Engels said: you’d think they really believed in all that—in myth, in tragedy. Is it the unconscious that represents itself through Oedipus and castration? Or is it the psychoanalyst—the psychoanalyst in us all, who represents the unconscious in this way? (They go on believing, whereas the Hellenists have long since stopped. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: 297)

*Who believed in all this? The Greeks? The Hellenists? How have then the Others – the non-Greeks, the non-Hellenists imagined and conceptualized “all this” – i.e. the question of Oedipus, of castration, of the phallus, and of *sexuation* – given that “castration is the basis for the anthropomorphic and molar representation of sexuality” in Freud (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: 297)? What kind of structure and function would the Oedipal come to take, if a culture is not determined/dominated, by (i) what Deleuze calls “the anthropomorphic representation of sex” (Deleuze, 2000: 294). What is it, then, that we get to see through the *Rearview Mirror* – through a turn to India’s past? What had happened to Freudian psychoanalysis when it was (played) out in what Spivak (1994) calls *the left field*? Far off from the metropolis? Did India become the *analysand* and provide to Freudian psychoanalysis ‘case material’ about the*

aboriginal world? Or did India question the Oedipal architectonics of Freudian psychoanalysis, somewhat like, and somewhat different from Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*? What was the nature of such ab-Original psychoanalysis? Was it inaugurating, as "savage Freud" (Nandy, 1995) Girindrasekhar Bose would suggest, "a new theory of mental life" and of 'sexuation', a theory *different* from the one offered by psychoanalysis in the original, a theory marked by insights drawn from what gets reflected in the 'rearview mirror', namely insights from the Yoga Sutra and the Bhagvad Gita, a theory "open still to intervention and the carving out of a practice that is *responsible by volleying responses* [back to the colonizer] rather than *imposing an alien science* [on the colonized]". Taking off from an extant logic of the Indian psyche (exemplified by epic manuscripts like the Mahabharata as against Greek Tragedy) was it offering to the west the *Indian logic* of the psyche (and not just the logic of the *Indian psyche*)?⁹ In addition, does Girindrasekhar render redundant the importance of the *phallus* and of *castration* that has been paradigmatic of much of psychoanalysis? In other words, is Bose moving from having or not-having an (part) object (and hence the consequent pride, envy, anxiety) to *identification* with a momentous Other; is he moving from the notion of a cannibalistic or devouring self to an image of self where the self extends itself laterally towards Others through *identification*, where Others are *mirrors* and not objects. Bose thus puts under erasure the European obsession with the phallus (and the Oedipal) as the structuring principle of psychic constitution (also see Dhar, 2017). Bose emerges as the dynamic an-Oedipal *third* (a third Freud thought was absent in Bose's work) between Oedipus and anti-Oedipus.

The point I am trying to make through the Windscreen View and the Rearview Mirror are twofold. One, critical windscreen views – such as the ones inaugurated by Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze-Guattari – in terms of a critique of metaphysics, and

⁹ What if castration complex is not the constitutive node/anchor of human psychic life? Does the text of the human psyche take a peculiar turn when one takes the Bhagvad Gita (as against the 'Sophoclean theatre') as the manuscript of human culture, as Bose had done? What if one builds on the transcript of the Kurukshetra? What is the configuration of the psychic that gets scripted in the Mahabharata? Can it usher in and inaugurate the thinking of another psychoanalysis – a psychoanalysis different from what the west could think of – given its obsession with Greek tragedy?

secret theology, as also the neurotic exegesis – can be seen to be related to two, colonial-cultural rearview perspectives – such as the one inaugurated by Bose through critiques of The Repressive Hypothesis and Oedipalisation. In other words, Deleuzian windscreen views, marked by *anti-oedipal* traditions, and Lacanian windscreen views, marked by *post-oedipal* traditions (I have in mind Lacan’s turn to Hamlet as against Oedipus; also the section titled “Beyond the Oedipus Complex” in Seminar XVII: *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*) can come to a productive dialogue with Bose’s (1921, 1948a, 1948b, 1949, 1951, 1966, 1980, 1999) rearview perspective, marked by *an-oedipal* traditions to think possible contours of the political. One could call, with some unease, such a re-thought contour *schizo-political*.

III. The ‘Graph of the Political’:

This takes us to the three meanings of madness: the first meaning marked by the ‘neurotic phenomenon’; the second meaning marked by the ‘psychotic phenomenon’, marked in turn by *verwerfung* (foreclosure) in Lacan, *cryptonymy* in Derrida, and *becoming-wolf* in Deleuze; the third meaning marked by what I would like to call the ‘political phenomenon’. By deploying Freud’s ‘writing’ of the Wolf Man’s life-history as the ground for the political Deleuze and Guattari move beyond the inherited separation of the psychoanalytic and the political; a somewhat dubious or perhaps paradoxical communion is set up between the second meaning and the third meaning of madness; this makes psychoanalysis schizoanalytic; and politics *schizo-political*; where schizo-politics could be seen as an uncanny form of the political imagination *beyond* (a) the Oedipalized triangle State-Party-Masses, (b) the mothering of the repressed/oppressed masses into liberation by the vanguard Party and (c) a smothering of flows, intensities, multiplicities by the State. Schizo-politics, however, is not ‘mad’ or ‘psychotic’ politics. Schizo-politics is [to counter] the seductive fascisms of “one size fits all” and its evil sidekick, the “single story told as though it’s the only one” (see Houle in Stivale, 2005:

96-97). The essence of schizo-politics, like schizo-philosophy¹⁰ or schizoanalysis, is not what politics is but its specific mode of *becoming*, becoming in *praxis*. Building on Foucault (Deleuze and Guattari, 2000: xiiil), one can argue that the schizo-political desires the freeing of political action from “totalizing paranoia”. It engenders the political by “proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction”, and not by “division and pyramidal hierarchization”. It withdraws allegiance from the “old [western] categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna) and moves instead to “positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities”. It believes “that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic”. “It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of *representation*) that possesses revolutionary force”. “It does not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. It uses instead “political *practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action*”. It does not demand of politics that it restore the “rights” of the individual. The individual is the “*product of power*”. What is needed is to “de-individualize”. Schizo-politics hence remains deeply, intensely and incessantly vigilant about “power”, *even the power of one’s own*.

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¹⁰ “Philosophy, for Deleuze, was not about creating correct pictures or theories of life, but *transforming* life. Philosophy is not something we apply *to* life. By thinking differently we create ourselves anew, no longer accepting already created and accepted values and assumptions. We destroy common sense and who we *are* in order to *become*” (Colebrook, 2002: xvii).

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